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Abstract—IoT devices are decentralized and deployed in un-
stable environments, which causes them to be prone to various
kinds of faults, such as device failure and network disruption.
Yet, current IoT platforms require programmers to handle faults
manually, a complex and error-prone task. In this paper, we
present IOTREPAIR, a fault-handling system for IoT that (1)
integrates a fault identification module to track faulty devices,
(2) provides a library of fault-handling functions for effectively
handling different fault types, (3) provides a fault handler on
top of the library for autonomous IoT fault handling, with user
and developer configuration as input. Through an evaluation in
a simulated lab environment and with various fault injection
methods, IOTREPAIR is compared with current fault-handling
solutions. The fault handler reduces the incorrect states on
average 50.01%, which corresponds to less unsafe and insecure
device states. Overall, through a systematic design of an IoT fault
handler, we provide users flexibility and convenience in handling
complex IoT fault handling, allowing safer IoT environments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things is constantly being developed to allow
for a wide array of devices to be deployed and interpret, react
to, and modify elements of a diverse set of environments. These
devices are distributed in an environment, and the connectivity
between them enables applications to manage some or all
of the decentralized devices autonomously. This autonomous
functionality can be used to provide services to users in home,
industrial, and vehicular deployments. However, decentralized
autonomous devices that interact with physical environments
must maintain high dependability for practical deployment.
IoT devices are abnormally prone to diverse faults due
to constraints such as minimal computational and energy
resources, architectural problems, and disruptive environmental
conditions [1], [2], [3], [4]. Faults can be caused by a
complication in the device, such as loss of power or a bug
in the software. A faulty device could become unresponsive
or manifest an incorrect state. These faults lead to improper
behavior with severe consequences, such as leaving a door
unlocked, allowing an adversary to break in the house, or
leaving a valve open, flooding a factory. Fault tolerance that
targets individual devices and applications is insufficient, as
interactions between applications can cause complex failures.
The unique requirements for fault tolerance in IoT have
been discussed [5], and prior works have proposed solutions
for fault identification [6], [7], [8], [2] and addressing faults [9],
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]. However, previous solutions
target a narrow scope, i.e., only certain devices, faults, or
environments, and often only notifies users about the fault—
assuming the user is familiar enough with the deployed devices,
installed applications, and fault types to act appropriately.
Additionally, the solutions that do perform automatic handling
rely on replication, which is not always effective [14] and may
be prohibitively costly [5]. Since IoT systems are primarily
autonomous, there is less interaction and oversight from users,
which could lengthen the time to resolve the fault manually. The
user must recognize the alert and respond to it, and there may
not be a user on site. Therefore, an automatic response to faults
is desirable to reduce dependency on swift user interventions
and increase the reliability of IoT services.
In this paper, we develop a flexible multi-layer fault-handling
system called IOTREPAIR specifically designed for IoT. At the
lower layer, IOTREPAIR provides a fault-handling library with a
set of functions for handling device faults and a configuration
file. To handle diverse faults in IoT, users can write their own
configuration files to customize the system and combine the
fault-handling functions through the library’s API. At the higher
layer, IOTREPAIR includes an automated fault handler on top of
the lower layer to handle common situations of IoT faults. The
automated handler can be installed onto the edge device of a
deployed IoT system to provide autonomous fault handling.
A configuration file is generated at installation time through
querying the edge device for a list of devices and applications,
and also modified at runtime by the fault handler for runtime
adaptation; e.g., the fault handler discovers redundant devices
at runtime and saves that information in the configuration file.
To evaluate IOTREPAIR, we implemented 11 distinct IoT apps
to manage 17 IoT devices in a simulated smart home. We
conducted three sets of experiments. The first is to measure the
latency of different handling methods. The second is to measure
effectiveness at reducing the errors in the system caused by
injected faults. The third is to measure the energy overhead of
the fault handler on devices. We inserted a comprehensive set
of faults into the devices to measure errors that faults would
cause that impact safety and security of the system, and how
well the fault handler mitigated these errors. We evaluated the
effectiveness in terms of incorrect states and energy overhead
when a single fault and multiple faults were present. IOTREPAIR
could reduce system errors by an average of 50.01%. In this
paper, we make the following contributions:
• We study the nature of faults in IoT systems. We show
what makes fault behavior in IoT systems different from
other environments and why addressing IoT faults is
uniquely difficult and requires a generalized solution.
• We design and implement a fault-handling library that
implements a common set of functions for handling device
faults, such as device restarts, retries, and checkpointing.
We provide flexible APIs for developers to utilize our
fault-handling library in their application code. On top of
the fault-handling library, we develop an automated fault
handler for IoT. The automated fault handler invokes fault-
handling functions in customized orders and configures
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the functions automatically based on the IoT environment.
• In designing IOTREPAIR, we propose a set of novel
techniques, including a history-based checkpoint/rollback
mechanism, and a technique for inferring redundant
devices according to runtime information.
• We evaluate IOTREPAIR on a simulated smarthome, includ-
ing 17 devices and 11 IoT apps. We show what harm
faults can cause and how IOTREPAIR mitigates the damage.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
We begin by introducing the fault types and the reasons that
IoT diverges from other computing platforms by focusing
on the IoT platform architectures, and then presenting an
example of IoT implementation to illustrate the fault types
(Section II-A). Lastly, we study eight IoT programming
platforms to understand their capabilities for fault handling
(Section II-B). Our study aims to characterize the current state
of fault tolerance in IoT systems and demonstrate the unique
challenges and design flaws that guide IOTREPAIR’s design.
A. Faults in IoT Systems
IoT systems integrate physical processes with digital con-
nectivity. These systems perform simple tasks such as motion-
activated light switches, as well as complex tasks such
as controlling traffic lights in a smart city. Regardless of
purpose and complexity, IoT systems often use an edge device
as a centralized gateway that connects devices in physical
environments and use a cloud back-end to synchronize device
states and provide interfaces to control and monitor devices.
Faults in IoT systems can occur due to flaws in components
of devices, edge device, cloud, and communication between
them. While faults may happen in any of these components,
device failures are more common due to factors such as
minimal computational resources, energy constraints, architec-
tural problems, improperly configured systems, and disruptive
environmental conditions [16], [17], [2], [11], [4]. For instance,
devices in smart homes could experience faults on average two
hours a day due to the power loss, network disruption, and
hardware failure [1]. In other veins, experiments in exposed
environments recorded half of the devices reporting incorrect
states due to severe weather conditions [3].
Scope. While fault tolerance includes techniques for both fault
identification and fault handling [18], in this work, we focus
entirely on the fault-handling aspect and assume there is already
a fault-identification module that can accurately identify the
faults in a timely manner. The fault can be simple fail-stop
faults, Byzantine faults, or faults injected by an adversary who
has gained remote or physical access to a device. At runtime,
the fault identification module sends a signal with the faulty
device ID to the handler when it detects a fault. The fault
handler then determines the way the fault should be handled.
Classifying Faults. An IoT device often consists of five
components (Figure 1, right): (i) a set of sensors such as
location, temperature, and light sensors, (ii) an auxiliary Micro-
Controller Unit (MCU) to read the raw sensor values, (iii) low
power CPU cores, (iv) network interfaces to communicate the
user-level events to end-users, and (v) a battery or a power
supply unit to power all these components. Components (ii) to
(v) are often housed in an edge device such as a hub. A fault in
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Fig. 1: IoT system architecture and illustration of fault types.
any of these components can lead to errors in the system. We
will use a temp-control app that subscribes to a thermostat, a
heater, and window actuators in order to illustrate the different
fault types and their consequences (See Figure 1). The app
opens the windows and notifies the user through SMS when the
temperature exceeds a user-defined threshold, and closes the
windows and sets heater to a user-defined temperature value
when the temperature is below the threshold.
We divide faults into three categories extending the ter-
minology in previous fault tolerance work [6] (See Table I).
Fail-stop faults happen when a device stops functioning and is
unresponsive to external requests; for example, when a device
loses power, network communication fails, or a software or
hardware error halts device operation. A fail-stop fault in the
thermostat would cause an app to halt entirely, and such a
fault in the window or heater would remove the functionality
of those actuators.
Non-fail-stop faults relate to a response by the device
that diverges from the desired device state. These faults can
manifest in a variety of ways with different effects, as shown
in [4]: an outlier fault appears when the temperature falls
outside of a reasonable range for a single device poll. An
unhandled outlier fault in thermostat could cause the app to
send an unintended notification that incorrectly indicates the
temperature is above the threshold. A stuck-at fault happens
when a device cannot change state, maintaining the same
state despite changes in environment or actuation commands.
An example is if the application opens the window, but the
temperature sensor fails to decrease the temperature as it
should, which causes a safety issue because an open window
enables a burglar to break in the house. A stuck-at fault could
also cause energy data analytics to be incorrect and home
temperature to surge if the heater gets stuck on. A high variance
fault appears when a device’s state fluctuates back and forth
more rapidly than the environment dictates. For example, the
temperature value fluctuates between high and low more than
the environment temperature. If this variance crosses the user-
defined temperature threshold, this could cause several issues
by repeatedly opening then closing the window and turning
the heater on and off. A spike fault happens when there are
a rapid increase and decrease in temperature faster than the
actual temperature in the environment. This could cause a
safety issue by incorrectly opening the window for periods
and turning on the heater and overheating the house—wasting
energy and causing discomfort.
A faulty device may cause cross-application cascading faults.
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Fault Type Description
Fail stop
Power Device loses power from battery or outlet and ceases to function
Communication Device disconnects from network or otherwise cannot send or receive packets and ceases to respond requests
Critical Error Hardware or software error causes device to cease to function
Non fail-stop
Outlier Device reports incorrect state for a single poll
Stuck-at Device fails to change state when expected to
High-Variance Device oscillates between states faster than environment dictates
Spike Numeric device state increases/decreases faster than environment dictates
Other Cascading Device enters incorrect state due to interaction with a faulty device through application code
TABLE I: Categorization of IoT device fault types and causes.
Fail-Stop Faults Non-Fail-Stop Faults
IoT Platform Comm. Power Crit Error Outlier Stuck-at High Var. Spike
SmartThings [19]    ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
OpenHab [20]    ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Vera [21]    ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Homekit [22] 	 	 	 ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
Wink [23] 	 	 	 ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
AndroidThings [24] ⊕ ⊕ ⊕ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
IoTivity [25] 	 	 	 ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
KaaIoT [26] 	 	 	 ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
 Silent 	 Generic Error ⊕ Detailed Error ⊗ Undetected
TABLE II: IoT platforms’ response to different device faults.
Undetected means that the fault is not recognized by the
platform; silent means no message sent to applications; generic
error means message does not contain fault information;
detailed error means message contains fault information.
Cascading faults happen when a faulty device in an app
incorrectly triggers an event in another app. To illustrate, we
consider a secure-home app co-located with the temp-control
app. The secure-home app controls a presence sensor, a door
lock, and a window actuator. The app keeps home secure—door-
locked and window-closed—when the user is at not home and
notifies the user if the house becomes insecure. An unhandled
spike fault in a thermostat in the temp-control app causes
an increase in temperature when the user is not home and
causes the window to open. The secure-home app then sends
an alert SMS to the user saying that the house is in an unsafe
state—which makes the user become unnecessarily panicked
and anxious. This behavior is correct from the secure-home
app, as the window should not be open; however, the window
is opened because of a fault that triggers the event handler
of the temp-control app—faults that influence the physical
spaces by a faulty device can propagate beyond the device
through interactions through applications.
B. Fault Tolerance in IoT Platforms
We have studied eight major IoT platforms to characterize
their fault identification and handling methods. The results for
each platform are shown in Table II, with undetected meaning
that the fault is not recognized by the platform, silent meaning
that it does not inform the applications, general error meaning
that applications are thrown an error that does not contain the
fault type, and detailed error meaning that applications are
given a thrown error that specifies the fault type. For instance,
SmartThings provides developers APIs to obtain the current
device state and can notify an app when the device state is
changed [27], so that an app developer could check for the state
changes before continuing execution. This requires additional
developer effort, and if a developer neglects this check, an
app would operate ignorant of whether a device failure exists.
Additionally, if a failed device is queried, SmartThings returns
the last known device state or some default value, which
may potentially return stale sensor states when a device is
unreachable. This enables an app to continue functioning, yet
the stale states may inadvertently actuate incorrect device states.
The results in the table show that only Android Things gives
enough information to handle fail-stop faults effectively, and
no platforms give the means for applications to handle non-fail-
stop faults. In contrast, IOTREPAIR is able to handle these types
of faults automatically, and further provides a toolset to allow
developers on any platform to perform their own handling.
III. APPROACH OVERVIEW
The variety of faults that can occur in IoT systems, combined
with the diversity of IoT deployments, requires a flexible fault-
handling approach. It is important that users can customize a
fault-handling system to address a variety of faulty devices,
fault types, deployment environments, and their preferences.
For this reason, we design IOTREPAIR to be flexible, with major
components presented in Figure 2.
First, the system provides a menu of fault-handling functions
as a library so that developers can invoke these functions
to mitigate or repair the faults. For instance, it provides a
retry function, which a developer can invoke to repeat some
functionality of a device if a previous use of that functionality
returned a fault. This is useful for resolving transient faults.
Second, the system provides an automated fault handler,
which takes a configuration file (discussed soon) and performs
fault handling without user involvement. It is parametrized
by a fault identification module, which detects faults and
provides the ID of the faulty device (and optionally provides
the fault type). In IOTREPAIR, we introduce the notion of
fault-handling schemes to organize and execute fault-handling
functions autonomously. A scheme is a list of fault-handling
functions to be invoked in a specific order. Each device is
assigned a scheme in the configuration file that determines
which fault-handling functions will be used to handle faults in
that device, and what order they will be called in.
Finally, the system includes a configuration file, which is
created during an initialization phase and updated by the
automated handler at runtime. During the initialization phase,
our system requests information about loaded identification
module and obtains a list of installed applications and connected
devices, their types, and capabilities; e.g., a motion sensor has
active and inactive states and hardware restart functionality. In
detail, there are three types of information in the configuration
file: (i) general parameters, defining the upper bound on how
long fault identification takes defined by the identification
module, as well as specifications for checkpoint cleanup and
3
Fig. 2: Overview of IOTREPAIR architecture
replicated device detection, specified by the user. (ii) device-
based parameters, defining the list of devices running in the
system and the parameters (e.g., which fault-handling scheme)
for each device; a list of default configurations for various
device types is defined in IoTRepair and each device has
its default set from the matching type in this list, or to a
conservative default if none exist default configurations are
generated for each device connected to the edge device by
selecting from a list of default configurations that best matches
the device type; they can be modified by the user, by the
automated handler at runtime, or by developers by making
API calls in their applications; (iii) application parameters,
listing what apps are installed on the edge device and whether
the application suppression is enabled for each; by default
application suppression is disabled. These components allow
IOTREPAIR to be flexible in addressing a variety of faults and
environments. We next discuss two modes through which
IOTREPAIRcan be used.
Developer API. In this mode, a developer can customize
and use IOTREPAIR through the fault-handling library. The
library provides an API for its functions (discussed later).
An application developer can utilize the API in two ways. The
simplest is to use a set of auxiliary functions to modify the
configuration file to customize the automated handler. The
second is for the application to call fault-handling functions
in the library directly. By using a try/catch block around
application code that interacts with devices, the app can call
handler functions in conjunction with their own code whenever
a fault occurs in a device. This allows them to handle faults
flexibly, although it is more effort on the developer part.
Automated Fault Handling. IOTREPAIR can be loaded into an
edge device. Once a faulty device is identified, the handler
performs device suppression, which blocks polls to the faulty
device and events generated by faulty devices. This prevents
faulty devices from triggering application code and causing
incorrect actuations. The handler then uses the configuration
file to see which scheme should be used for handling the fault
for this device. The handler then calls fault-handling functions
in the order specified in the scheme, and each function uses
the information in the configuration file while attempting to
handle the fault. If the fault is repaired at any stage of the
scheme, fault handling immediately ends, and the device is
added back for normal execution. If the scheme ends without
the device being repaired, the user is notified that the device
must be manually repaired and the handling ends.
IV. CHALLENGES IN IOT FAULT HANDLING
Compared to the fault handling in other computing platforms
such as distributed systems and cloud services, IoT systems
raise a set of unique challenges. We present these challenges
below and how we address each.
First, there is no single fault handler function that can address
all possible device faults, due to the vast array of heterogeneous
IoT devices and the diverse set of environments in which they
are deployed. Implementing an optimal handling technique for
a specific fault is highly contextual—one cannot define the
impact or correctness of fault handling without understanding
the environment. For instance, different devices may require
reordering functions to be executed to fit power or computation
constraints, or a device might be more prone to either transient
or permanent failures. To address this, we developed a set of
functions that can be combined in any order depending on
the device and configuration. We also created several built-in
schemes that can execute these functions in different orders or
exclude some entirely. These schemes can be chosen to meet
the system and environmental requirements such as safety
and security, and availability. We present the fault-handling
functions and schemes in Section V.
The second challenge is device replication. In IoT deploy-
ments, environmental factors can make device functionality
less reliable, and permanent failures in sensor readings and
actuations are frequent. The goal of replication is to switch
between primary devices and replicas without user intervention.
To do this, we automate detecting redundant devices that are an
exact duplicate through exploring sensor states on startup, and
every time a new device is plugged in to the IoT system. This
enables the system to fail-over from a faulty to the replicating
device and to revert automatically when the device is no longer
faulty. This also allows for multiple replications in case of
cascading or simultaneous faults. We discuss duplicate device
detection and alternate devices to find devices that provide the
same functionality in Section V-A.
The last challenge relates to implementing practical rollback
functions, which must consider not only the faulty device but
all devices in an environment to determine a valid checkpoint
for rollback. In general, rollback in distributed systems such as
IoT is exceptionally challenging. Most rollback mechanisms
ask each distributed process to checkpoint individually, and
each process rollbacks to its recently used checkpoint [28].
In IoT environments, many factors in the system deployment
determine the optimal rollback, such as the number of devices,
correlation of device states, the urgency of fault correction, and
consistency of system states. For instance, it is essential that
the door is locked when the user is away, so a rollback would
lock the door as soon as a fault was identified in the presence
sensor. For this purpose, we implement a rollback scheme
that rejects partial rollbacks; so if any device that requires a
state change to match the checkpoint is faulty, the rollback is
canceled. This method guarantees that the system is not in an
undesired state no matter the implementation or fault. We will
discuss our rollback in Section V-B.
Design Requirements and Assumptions. We present the
requirements of IOTREPAIR to operate effectively. First, some
fault-handling functions, such as rollback and checkpoint,
require access to the device states; thus, we assume that device
4
Device-based Functions
bool activate_redundant_device (String device_ID){...}
int retry (String device_ID, FP verifyFunc†,
String[][] expectedValues†, bool isFailstop†){...}
bool device_software_restart (String device_ID)){...}
bool device_hardware_restart (String device_ID){...}
None notifyUser (String device_ID){...}
Environment-based Functions
bool checkpoint (String[] device_values){...}
int rollback (String device_ID){...}
int transaction (String[][] actuations){...}
Auxiliary Functions
bool AddDevice (String[] device_ID){...}
bool RemoveDevice (String[] device_ID){...}
bool UpdateDeviceConfig (String[] device_ID, ConfigOptions‡){...}
bool UpdateAppConfig (ConfigOptions‡){...}
†Marks optional arguments. ‡ ConfigOptions represents a series of arguments
for all configuration parameters for the device/application.
TABLE III: Fault handling functions prototypes.
Initially motion sensors are considered potentially replicating. As time
continues, Motion1 differs in state and is no longer considered, while 
Motion2 and Motion3 stay paired long enough to become replicating.
Presence1: P1
Motion1: M1
Motion2:    M2
Motion3:    M3
P1 M1
M2 M3
P1 M1
M2 M3
P1 M1
M2 M3
Example Sensors Initially Considered 
Sensor Pairs
M1 Differs In State Replication Time 
Threshold Reached
Fig. 3: Example of Automatic Replication Detection.
states are available through polling. Second, IOTREPAIR relies
on the edge device (e.g., the hub) being able to query or record
the ID and model of all connected devices. Third, we assume
that there is a fault-identification module that provides the
faulty device ID for each detected fault. Any system that can
provide the faulty device ID can be integrated into IOTREPAIR.
Finally, we assume that our implementation is injected into the
edge device and it can access the aforementioned capabilities
and its library functions are exposed to applications.
V. FAULT-HANDLING FUNCTIONS
We introduce a set of functions to handle faults effectively.
We present these functions in three groups, presented in
Table III. We then discuss four built-in fault-handling schemes
that can be integrated into diverse IoT environments.
A. Device-based Functions
Device-based functions are an implementation of isolated
fault handling, which considers only the state of the faulty
device, but not the overall state of the system. The effectiveness
of the function depends only on the specifications of the faulty
device and the nature of the fault. The functions do not affect
and are not affected by any other devices in the system.
Activate Redundant Device. We define redundant devices to
be of two types: (a) an exact replicate of the primary device;
for instance, a motion sensor may be a redundant device of
another motion sensor; (b) providing the same capabilities as
the primary device; for example, a security camera that is able
to detect motion can be a redundant device for a motion sensor.
IOTREPAIR provides the support for both types by allowing the
user to specify a device’s replicate or same-capability devices in
the configuration file. The function ActivateRedundantDevice
enables swapping active devices and allows for the system to
continue to run unaffected by the detected fault, but requires the
fault handler to know what devices can act as redundant devices
for the faulty device. Specifically, it takes the faulty device ID
as a parameter and then checks the configuration file to see
if the device has redundant devices. If there is, it changes the
device references in the edge device’s connections so that polls
and actuation commands to the faulty device are redirected to a
replicating device. Here, we use active replication [29] to reduce
the device activation overhead. In this, replicating devices are
always active; thus, there is no additional computation to be
performed after a device is replicated. In the case where more
than one replicated device is set, the devices will be used in
the order specified by the configuration.
To ease the burden of writing configuration files, IOTREPAIR’s
detects redundant devices and automatically generates relevant
configuration data. Currently, the support is only for type (a).
Finding a redundant device for type (a) in an IoT environment
must consider the fact that similar devices are not necessarily
co-located. To address this, we collect the sensor states and
check whether devices report the same states in a given time
threshold. If the two device states are the same and the
transition probabilities converge with the events, these devices
are identified to be replicating. This auto-generated duplicate
device information can also be manually edited by the user
for confirmation. Figure 3 illustrates two co-located motion
sensors detected as replicating as their states match consistently,
while an unrelated presence sensor and distant motion sensor
are discarded. To detect redundant devices of type (b), recent
techniques such as using device fingerprints to automatically
pair co-located devices [30] could be easily integrated into
IOTREPAIR as devices reacting to the context of their environment
in similar manners means the fingerprint of one device can
indicate what the value of the other device should be.
Retry Device State. Retry is effective at handling short,
transient faults in devices, stalling device execution long enough
to let the fault resolve itself and preventing excessive handling
from being performed. Retry takes parameters of the device ID
and three optional arguments: a function pointer for a validation
function, a list of expected device states, and whether the fault
is fail-stop or not. When used by the automated handler, these
may be supplied by the fault identification module. Additionally,
the configuration file specifies the max duration of retry for the
faulty device. If no optional arguments are passed, the retry
will delay other fault-handling functions for this length of time.
If a function pointer is given, it is assumed that the function
checks if the device is faulty, and it will be called continuously
to determine if the fault is still present. If a list of expected
values is passed, then the retry will poll the device continually
for the duration; if the device returns the expected state several
polls in a row, it will mark the fault as resolved and end
fault handling. If the fault is identified as fail-stop, then any
successfully returned state will be treated as the expected value.
After the length of time expires, if the fault is non-fail-stop, the
retry will disable the app and device suppression for the passed
device and then wait for a time length equal to the upper bound
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Motion Light
Timestamp System Checkpoints
Timestamp Frequency Motion Light
System Device States
t_0 N/A N/A N/A N/AOn On
t_1 1 Off Off
t_2 1 On On
t_1 1 Off Off
t_2 1 On On
t_3 2 Off Off
t_2 1 On Off
t_4 1 Off On
t_1 Off Off
t_2 On On
t_3 Off Off
t_4 Off On
Fig. 4: Checkpoint illustration taken during system execution.
on fault detection for the loaded fault identification module. If
no fault is detected during this time, then the fault was transient
and is marked as resolved, and fault handling ends. If a fault
is detected or the fault was fail-stop, retry function terminates.
Software and Hardware Restart. Restarting can be useful
for either a software or hardware fault. SoftwareRestart
and HardwareRestart take a device ID and send a signal
to the faulty device to initiate a software and hardware restart,
respectively. The configuration file will also be read for the
device to determine the max number of attempts to restart.
If no acknowledgment signal is received, the command will
be repeated, and if it is never acknowledged the restart will
be aborted and return with an error code. If the restart is
acknowledged, the function will continually poll the device to
see when the restart is completed. Once the restart is completed,
if the fault was not fail-stop, the function will disable the app
and device suppression for the passed device and then wait for
a length of time equal to the upper bound on fault detection for
the loaded fault identification module. If no fault is detected
during this time, then the restart resolved the fault and fault
handling ends. If a fault is detected or the fault was fail-stop,
the restart function ends unsuccessfully.
The implementation of restart functions are device-dependent.
Many IoT market devices such as Honeywell Z-Wave Thermo-
stat [31] and open-source electronics platforms such as Arduino
implement device restart functionality.
User Notification. Notify takes a device ID and notifies users
of the fault and the result of fault handling. The implementation
of the notify call is platform-dependent; we inform users
through alert messages on the console, yet text messages or
push notifications are possible through IoT platform APIs.
Event triggers for user notification can be configured for each
device to notify the user when a fault cannot be repaired by the
handler when a fault has been repaired by the handler, when a
fault occurs, or any combination of these.
B. Environment-based Functions
Environment-based functions are an implementation linked
fault handling, which mitigates cascading faults. It responds
to a fault by considering the states of all devices in an
IoT environment, e.g., linked fault handling should close the
window that was incorrectly opened by an app due to the
faulty thermostat. Our environment-based functions consider
the state of all devices in the environment. As these functions
can affect all device states in an environment, they are capable
of mitigating cascading failures across the system.
Checkpoint. Checkpoint stores all device states in the system
at the time it is called. We divide device states into sensor
states and actuator states. Sensor states are read-only states that
collectively represent the state of the environment and drive
behavior. Actuator states can be read and modified through
actuation, and they are the states that can be rolled back.
We assume that there is a causal relation from sensor to
actuator states; in other words, an app follows the well-known
sensor-computation-actuator structure: it takes the sensor states,
performs some computation, and then performs actuation to
modify the actuator states. Based on this, IOTREPAIR includes a
novel, history-based checkpoint/rollback mechanism (1) that
during checkpointing records the history of device states, and
(2) that during rolling back restores the most likely actuator
states by looking up the history according to the current sensor
states. We next discuss this mechanism in detail.
First, the automated fault handler invokes the checkpoint
function after every actuation that does not trigger cascading
actuations. This means a checkpoint is taken after actuations
where no subscribing application initiates an actuation based on
the new state. The handler determines these states by checking
all apps logic subscribed to the actuated device to ensure no
additional actuation is performed as a result.
Second, after a checkpoint is taken, some time must pass
before it is considered valid and appended to a history log
of checkpoints. The delay period is determined by the upper
bound on the fault-detection time so that the module can ensure
that no faults were present at the time the checkpoint was taken.
When the delay expires, the new checkpoint is then stored
in a history log, which holds checkpoints and their frequencies.
If no previous checkpoint has matching sensor states, a
new checkpoint is appended to the log. If the sensor states
match an existing checkpoint’s sensor states, the frequency is
incremented if actuator states also match, or the actuator states
are overwritten, and the frequency is reset to be one if the
actuator states differ. Only storing the most recent sensor states
for a set of sensor states keeps the log from exploding in size.
For the same reasons, checkpoints are removed from history if
they remain unused for an extended time, as determined by the
configuration. Figure 4 provides an example of how checkpoints
are taken over time in a system as a result of changes in
actuator states. The example uses a simple system with two
devices: a motion sensor and a light actuator. The figure shows
checkpoints being taken during a series of actuations, which
occur at time-stamps t1 through t4, with initial time t0 before
actuations. On the left side of the figure, the state of the system
after the actuation completes is shown. On the right is the list
of checkpoints at each time, starting from an empty set and
updating after each actuation. The first two checkpoints at times
t1 and t2 are new states, since there are no existing checkpoints
that match the sensor states. For these new checkpoints, the
time they occurred and current device states are recorded, and
the frequency is set to 1. The checkpoint taken at t3 has the
same device states as an existing checkpoint; so it updates
the checkpoint time-stamp and the frequency. At time t4, a
checkpoint that matches the sensor states is taken, but the
actuator states do not match those of an existing checkpoint;
so the matching checkpoint’s time-stamp is updated, actuator
states are overwritten, and frequency is reset.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm For Rollback
Input : The ID of the device that triggered this rollback
Output : Success or Failure
1 Read configuration file to get rollbackType
2 Get targetCriteria for rollbackType bestMatch← ∅
3 Search through Checkpoints to find checkpoint that fits
targetCriteria and store it in bestMatch
4 if bestMatch equals ∅ then
5 return Failure
6 if any device in systemState is an actuator, its state does not match
bestMatch , and is faulty then
7 return Failure
8 Actuate each actuator in systemState to match bestMatch
9 Change each faulty sensor state in systemState to match bestMatch
10 return Success
Rollback. Rollback performs a series of actuations to match
the system state to the checkpoint that best reflects the
current system sensor values. Algorithm 1 details the steps for
computing rollback that finds all potential matches, determines
the best match and performs actuation to match the best match.
We have designed three techniques for choosing the best
checkpoint to target for rollback. The configuration for the
faulty device determines which technique will be used. Most
Recent targets the checkpoint that has occurred in the system
most recently. This technique is suitable for a system where
faults can be detected quickly or system state changes slowly.
Fail-safe uses the fail-safe configurations for all of the actuators
in the system to reduce the list of checkpoints to only those
where actuators match their fail-safe states; e.g., the fail-safe
configuration for an alarm might be to have it on. From
this reduced list, a checkpoint whose sensor states match the
current sensor states in the system is selected. As the states
of faulty sensors cannot be trusted, their sensor states cannot
be considered when determining if a checkpoint matches the
current sensor states. Because of this, it is possible that multiple
checkpoints match the current known state of non-faulty sensors.
If there is more than one match (or no match is found), then the
frequency is used as a tiebreaker. Fail-norm finds checkpoint
matches in the same fashion as fail-safe, but does not reduce
the list based on fail-safe configurations first and will not roll
back to a checkpoint if none matches.
Rollbacks can be dangerous, as a partial rollback can result in
an otherwise impossible transition and enter an invalid system
state. For this reason, our rollback fails if any actuator that
needs to be changed is currently faulty (lines 6–7). We note
that this captures the heterogeneous nature of IoT devices
when compared to similar functions in distributed systems [28]
and cyber-physical systems [32]. We also implement a data
rollback as part of the system rollback. Specifically, as long
as the rollback does not fail, the values of any faulty sensors
also set to their values at the time of the checkpoint until the
device is repaired or another rollback occurs (Line 9).
Figure 5 gives an example of how fail-norm rollback would
operate in a system with two sensors, motion and presence, and
a lock actuator for a door. It shows that IOTREPAIR’s rollback
can mitigate dangerous faults that would otherwise persist
until the user can repair the faulty device, as long as another
sensor’s state is correlated with the faulty sensor’s state with
high frequency. In the example of Figure 5, a presence sensor
Motion Presence Door Lock
Off Faulty (stuck at home) Unlocked
Current System State:
Frequency Motion Presence Door Lock
History of Checkpoints:
30 On Home Unlocked
2 On Away Locked
3 Off Home Unlocked
50 Off Away Locked
Bottom two match the motion sensor state and the second 
one has higher frequency; so rollback the door to be locked
Fig. 5: New example of Fail-norm Rollback
that is stuck at home could cause the door to remain unlocked
indefinitely. Fortunately, the motion sensor’s state is largely
correlated with the presence sensor’s state, because it is likely
to detect user motion when the user is at home. As a result,
IOTREPAIR’s rollback can then use the motion sensor’s state to
correct the door to be locked and secure the home, even when
the presence sensor is faulty.
Transaction. A transaction performs a series of actuations
and ensures that the actuations are performed atomically as a
group, either all successfully completing or none completing.
Currently, the transaction function is not automated, yet app
developers can invoke it to cause a series of actuations to
execute atomically when a partially executed series may leave
the system in an unsafe state. For instance, a developer can issue
a call “transaction([[Window, Closed], [Heater, On]])”
to close the Windows and turn on the heater as a transaction.
Transaction operates as a standard undo-log-based algorithm.
It performs each of these actuations in the order given in the
passed array while recording the original states in an undo log.
If any actuation fails, the transaction is aborted, all devices are
reset to their previous states, and an error is returned.
C. Auxiliary Functions
We describe functions necessary for the operation of the
fault handler. These functions are not directly used during
fault handling but can be invoked by the automated handler or
application developers to modify handler configuration.
Device Suppression. It is not a library function, but rather a
capability injected into the code of an edge device (e.g., hub).
This is because it is required to interrupt polls and event hooks
at the edge device. Through this capability, the edge device
can terminate polling the device’s state and block actuation
commands sent to the device. This prevents events from a faulty
device triggering incorrect actuations to other devices through
app code. Device suppression is effective in correcting non-
fail-stop faults. For example, if the smoke detector experiences
a high variance fault, it may rapidly switch between smoke-
detected and smoke-not-detected states. This would cause the
alarm to turn on and off until the fault is resolved. With device
suppression, the smoke detector can be suppressed once it is
identified as faulty.
Application Suppression. Similar to device suppression, ap-
plication suppression is also a capability injected into the in
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Scheme Function Ordering
Conservative 1 2 3 4 5 6
Transient-resistant 1 3 4 5 6 ∅
Long-Restart 1 2 5 3 4 6
Time-sensitive 1 5 2 3 4 6
TABLE IV: Execution order of functions in schemes. (1)
Replicate; (2) Retry; (3) Software Restart; (4) Hardware Restart;
(5) Rollback; (6) Notify User.
the edge device code. Application suppression can be enabled
or disabled for each app based on the configuration file. When
a device is identified as faulty, application suppression checks
the list of apps subscribed to the device’s events. For every app
that application suppression is enabled, all events that would
be sent to the app and all commands generated by the app
are suppressed. This halts the execution of the app, which is
desirable when an app has functionality that may put the system
into an unsafe state if the state of one of its dependent devices
is unknown. For example, an app that opens the window when
the presence sensor indicates the user is home and the house
is too hot may open the window while the presence sensor is
faulty if the temperature gets too hot.
Update Configuration. This allows the automated fault han-
dler to update the configuration file at runtime. Configuration
data for a device or an application can be updated, if the passed
arguments are deemed valid for the configuration options.
D. Built-in Fault-Handling Schemes
We introduce a set of built-in schemes to automate the
functions above (See Table IV). These schemes modify the
execution order of the functions to address requirements such as
safety and security and real-time fault detection and correction.
We chose to use the device type as a primary determinant
of each scheme as IoT devices introduce several limitations,
e.g., duration of restarts, and whether a replicated device is
available, which impacts the optimal functions ordering. We
created four schemes for our evaluation based on properties
we discovered across our device set. These are not designed to
address all possible deployments, and additional schemes can
easily be created considering the deployment requirements as
new handling functions are developed.
We describe the purpose of each scheme and show the order
they execute the functions. Each scheme starts with trying to
activate a redundant device to see if the fault can be repaired.
If not, the conservative scheme then uses retry to fix the fault,
which will be successful if the fault is transient. This fits
in environments where there are no strict time requirements.
The transient-resistant scheme is similar to the conservative
scheme, yet it skips the retry function. This aims at devices
that are unlikely to experience transient faults. For instance,
this would be suitable for a temperature sensor deployed in a
stable home environment, since it is capable of restarting and
does not control time-sensitive operations. The long-restart
scheme is used in devices that have excessively long software
and hardware restart times, such as security cameras and a
smart refrigerator. The restart functions are moved to the end
of the scheme so that other functions are attempted prior to
the long restart. The time-sensitive scheme removes retry and
moves rollback ahead of the restart functions. It aims to return
the system to the desired state as the device impacts the safety,
for instance, when the security system is unresponsive. This
scheme fits industrial or vehicle environments where many
devices are deployed, and system integrity is the top priority.
This would be implemented in devices like smoke alarms,
which could cause a fire hazard if down for even a short time.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We simulated a smart home in a lab setting using a set
of IoT devices and applications. In this section, we begin
by introducing our simulated devices and applications, and
then present fault injection and fault identification techniques
required for our evaluation of IOTREPAIR.
Implementation Setup. We deployed a set of Arduino devices
that were connected to and run in parallel on an AVR Arduino
Mega 2560 Rev 3 Board [33]. We utilized a mixture of analog
and digital devices. The initial data collection was run until
50K device states gathered to collect the patterns of device
behaviors. The polled data was output into a file that stores the
behavior of sensors and actuators as the environment changes
were observed. We use the sensor data to generate a realistic
trace through simulated devices that represent a range of activity
in a smart home. We use this trace of sensor states as input
to a trace-driven simulation, which simulates the behavior of
eleven IoT applications (detailed below).
IoT Devices and Applications. We deployed six different
types of sensors and two types of actuators, for a total of eight
types of Arduino devices. Table VI presents the types of devices
by ID, characteristics of each including the power consumption,
read time for states, and the type of sensor output values. These
devices are used in a simulated smart home environment where
IoT applications are deployed. In the simulated environment,
we deployed seven sensors, one for each type of sensors and
also a replicated smoke detector. We also deployed 10 actuators
of the two types, as our environment required a higher number
of actuators than we had available in our lab. Table V shows
the description of applications and devices used in each of
them. These apps are selected to cover all spectrum of home
environment functionality, including green living, convenience,
home automation, security and safety, and personal care.
Fault Injection. In our evaluation, we use fault injection
to evaluate the effectiveness of fault handling. There is an
explosion of possible fault scenarios that can occur in an
IoT environment due to the many factors that can influence
a fault. Our fault injection aims to take into account these
factors, including fault type, fault length, device type, whether
a fault can be repaired automatically, the state of other devices
when the fault occurs, and the events that occur during the
fault’s presence. First, we inject faults evenly across all devices.
Second, we specify that a fault can be repaired through
software/hardware restarts, with equal chances.
The fault type, fault length, device states, and events are
injected within reasonable distributions because these values
impact the number of incorrect states that occurs from faults,
rather than how the faults should be handled. After we have
specified the fault injection parameters, we construct an input
file that specifies when and what faults are injected and
optionally when and what faults are removed in the trace. This
allows our simulation to accept custom sets of faults to represent
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ID App Name Description S/A†
App1 Motion-Activated-Lights When motion detected, turn on lights. Turn off lights when motion not active. S.1, A.1
App2 Smoke-Alarm When smoke is detected sound alarm and unlock doors. When no smoke is detected turn off alarm. S.5, A.2
App3 Temperature-Control Keep temperature between 70-80 degrees (◦F) by turning heater and air conditioner on and off S.3, A.2
App4 Water-Leak-Detector When leak is detected sound alarm and close water valve. When no leak is detected turn off alarm and open water valve. S.6, A.2
App5 Welcome-Home When the user arrives home, unlock doors and turn on coffee machine S.4, A.1
App6 Secure-Patio When user is not present and contact is detected, send text message to user S.2, S.4, A.2
App7 Energy-Saver If window is open and either heater or air conditioner is on, close window. A.1, A.2
App8 Secure-Home when user is not present home, lock doors and close windows. S.4,A.1
App9 Intruder-Detector When user is not present home and motion is detected, send text message to user S.1, S.4, A.2
App10 Alarm-Safety When alarm is activated, turn on lights A.1, A.2
App11 Morning-Air Open windows and close windows at specific times A.1, A.2
† S is for Sensor and A is for Actuator device (Sensors and actuators are listed in Table VI.)
TABLE V: IoT apps, their sensors/actuators and descriptions, developed to evaluate IOTREPAIR.
ID† Device‡ Power (mW) Read (ms) Output
S.1 Motion sensor 66 0.1 double, 8B
S.2 Contact sensor 0.1 0.1 int, 4B
S.3 Temperature, pressure, altitude sensor 19.5 37.5 double, 8B
S.4 Presence sensor 1.3 0.5 int*3,12B
S.5 Smoke detector 30 0.96 double, 8B
S.6 Leak detector 80 0.1 double, 8B
A.1 Door lock, coffee machine, light 0.01 0.1 -
A.2 Alarm, air conditioner, heater, window, valve 100 0.1 -
† S is for Sensor and A is for Actuator.
‡We use Arduiono compatible devices to simulate the devices in IoT apps. For instance, a
flame detector is used for smoke-alarm, and switches are used for the lights (see Section VI).
TABLE VI: Details of sensors/actuators used in our IoT apps.
diverse IoT environments. Here, we generate permanent and
transient faults based on the specifications of each evaluation
(Section VII). Permanent faults are characterized through arrival
time, length, type, and false value of every desired injected fault.
For example, an injected fault entry, (1000, 0, UNFIXABLE,
1), injects a fault at the 1000th poll time into the motion sensor
(with device ID 1), it cannot be repaired (UNFIXABLE), and it
causes the devices to be stuck at value motion-detected (device
state being 0). For transient faults, an additional line must be
added, such as (2000, 0, NO_FAULT, 0), which removes the
fault from the 0th device at poll time 2000. Faults are injected
or removed at the beginning of each 1-second polling cycle
before any application or handler code is run.
Fault Identification. As discussed earlier, IOTREPAIR is param-
eterized by a fault identification module. There are a wide array
of identification algorithms available, discussed in Section IX.
In our evaluation, we choose to use a perfect identification
module that identifies faults instantly and correctly to show
the maximum possible benefit of IOTREPAIR.
VII. EVALUATION
We present our evaluation on the performance of IOTREPAIR’s
fault-handling functions and automated handler (Section VII-A).
Furthermore, we assess the effectiveness of IOTREPAIR through
injecting single and multiple faults (Section VII-B). Finally,
we evaluated the power consumption of each run, and found
that IOTREPAIR reduced power consumption over not having any
handler. The detailed results of power consumption evaluation
can be found in Appendix A.
We discuss a couple of notes before we proceed. First,
unless otherwise specified, we assume that the smoke detector
and smart lights have replicated devices. These devices were
chosen to demonstrate device replication because smart homes
are likely to deploy multiple such devices. Second, in our evalu-
ation, we found that the fail-norm checkpoint is consistently the
Fig. 6: The numbers illustrate the avg. time for each function
to execute in msecs. This time is averaged across simulated de-
vices, possible function parameters, and runtime environments.
best match for all devices. We also found that several devices,
such as the contact sensor, did not have sufficient correlation
with other devices for an effective rollback. Therefore, we used
fail-norm or no rollback accordingly across our devices.
A. Fault Handling Latency
In this experiment, we evaluate the latency of functions
in IOTREPAIR’s fault-handling library and also the latency of
its automated handler when using a specific fault-handling
scheme. To get timing information, we examine the logic of
a fault-handling function to track CPU operations and device
interactions. Time spent on CPU operations is then calculated
based on the processing speed of a representative SmartThings
IoT Hub [34]. Time for device interactions is determined by
device manuals for the simulated physical devices, or our
implemented Arduino devices when datasheets are insufficient.
Function Timing. For this evaluation, we analyzed our fault-
handling functions to get the CPU operations and device
interactions performed across all devices, parameters, and fault
types. We then calculated the running time of each execution,
and the mean and standard deviation across all executions
of each function. We used permanent faults and short (under
1 second) transient faults to represent the most likely fault
conditions. We also did not consider fault-identification time
when calculating runtime as our work focuses on fault handling.
The results are illustrated in Figure 6. Retry takes the longest
to execute because it always waits for either the duration of
the fault, the device based timeout, or at least one read of the
faulty device’s state to confirm that the fault is resolved. In an
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Fig. 7: Avg. timings in msecs to illustrate how long each
scheme takes to handle different types of faults, and how long
each scheme takes to rollback.
environment with longer fault durations and longer timeouts,
retry’s runtime increases; for this reason, retry’s runtime has a
large standard deviation. Conversely, checkpoint, and replicate’s
runtime are mostly stable; their operations are independent of
devices and fault type and are primarily composed of CPU
operations. Actuation commands dominate Rollback’s runtime,
and so the deviation is caused by how many devices require
actuation to rollback to the selected checkpoint. In our example
setup, the average number of actuations is 1.76; so the rollback
time can increase for deployments with more devices. Software
and hardware restart vary depending on device restart time and
how many restart commands are sent. They vary a little across
devices but do not vary much across system deployments, as
most devices have similar restart times.
From these latencies, we find that all of our functions are
fast enough to handle faults effectively. Reading a device state
for most Arduino devices takes 6ms, and this is even longer
in a real home deployment with distributed devices that must
communicate over a network. This means most of our functions
consistently take less time to execute than a device-state read.
Time to Handle Faults. We evaluated IOTREPAIR’s automated
handler by organizing the fault-handling functions into the
schemes defined in Section V-D. We calculated the running time
across all possible permutations of devices, function parameters,
fault types, and schemes to obtain the average time each scheme
takes to handle each fault type. We aim at evaluating the
completion time of schemes for different fault types such
as power and hardware. The results are shown in Figure 7,
where the average time to handle a fault is shown for each
scheme, alongside the average time each scheme takes to
rollback. Rollback is the only form of fault mitigation that takes
significant time. The rollback time to complete is dependent on
where in the scheme rollback is called and system factors such
as the checkpoint list size; therefore, we show rollback time
for each scheme separately. In the graph, optimal is the time it
will take if fault-handling functions were chosen with perfect
knowledge of the fault and system. Using the proper scheme
can result in repairs or mitigation occurring over twice as fast.
In the figure, power and communication faults are underlined
in red since our handling techniques cannot repair the fault.
In these cases, rollback time is more critical, as mitigation
techniques can still remove some errors caused by faults. For
Fig. 8: The number of incorrect states in each execution type
for Single and Multiple fault evaluations. The results show a
significant decrease in incorrect states from No Handle and
Suppression only to our fault handling schemes.
these faults, the handling time is only an indication of how
long it takes the handler to recognize that the fault is unfixable
and notify the user. We also found that, for most cases, it
may take 10ms or longer to handle the fault, so IOTREPAIR is
most useful for faults that last longer than a few milliseconds.
However, even for short faults, suppression and replication
help mitigate errors.
B. Effectiveness
To evaluate the effectiveness of IOTREPAIR, we measure the
number of incorrect devices states that occur over executions.
A device is in an incorrect state when it differs from the state it
was in at that time in the faultless execution, for the same input.
This metric is used to show the effectiveness of IOTREPAIR in
reducing the effects of faults in devices. Note that this metric
is a conservative definition since a fault handler may correct a
device to a state acceptable to users even if it differs from the
faultless execution state. However, we use the incorrect-state
metric since it does not require an acceptable-state definition,
which is user and application-specific.
For evaluation, we execute the simulation: a© when no faults
are present, b© when faults occur without a fault-handling
system, c© when faults are addressed with device suppression,
and d© when IOTREPAIR handles faults. The baseline of the
correct device states is obtained through the execution of a©.
We evaluate the effectiveness of the four fault-handling schemes
discussed in Sec. V-D, and compare the baseline with each
experiment by computing the number of incorrect device states
caused by the injected faults across each of the executions. The
reduction in incorrect states towards execution a© evaluates the
effectiveness of each scheme’s fault handling. We detail our
findings when a single fault and multiple faults occur and The
Table VII in appendix A gives examples of injected faults in
the system and their effects in each execution.
Single Faults. In our first effectiveness experiment, we consider
single faults–when no more than one fault is in the system
at any given time. This is typically caused in an IoT system
when a single device runs out of battery, gets damaged by the
environment, or experiences a communication interruption. The
“Single” section of Figure 8 presents the number of incorrect
states over different executions. The transient-resistant scheme
was the most effective scheme for handling single faults. It
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shows a 63.51% decrease in incorrect states over no handler
and a 60.43% decrease over device suppression; this represents
significant mitigation of the effects of faulty devices. Other
schemes, although performing slightly worse than the transient-
resistant scheme, also show a significant improvement over the
cases of no handler and suppression.
We found during our experiments that our fault-handling
functions can cause incorrect states that are not present in the
no-handler case. 22.84% of the incorrect states in the transient-
resistant execution are caused by the handler and occur because
of an incorrect rollback or because the system with no handler
happens to be correct by coincidence. For the first reason,
our rollback chooses a checkpoint most likely to be correct
based on prior states and configuration, but this can cause
incorrect states if the system was in an undesired state at the
time the checkpoint was taken, or if the usual type of rollback
for this device is wrong for the current fault or environmental
conditions. For the second reason, the faulty state of a sensor
may happen to match what the correct state should be, but
IOTREPAIR decides to suppress events from faulty devices. An
example of this is an error where the faulty temperature value
causes the heater on, but during the time it takes IOTREPAIR to
fix the fault, the temperature falls, changing the environment so
that the heater being on is correct. In this case, the no-handler
execution turning on the heater achieved the correct state while
IOTREPAIR causes an incorrect state.
To conclude, the fault-handling functions reduce the incorrect
states over device suppression and when no fault handling is
used. For the incorrect states that the handler does not cause,
the state cannot be corrected through any means we are aware
of. This is because no handling function can perfectly solve a
core device experiencing a permanent fault, and faulty states
can occur after fault is identified, but before fault handling
completes. For the incorrect states caused by IOTREPAIR, our
evaluation shows that suppression and rollback remove many
more incorrect states than they generate.
Multiple Faults. In our second set of experiments, we consider
multiple faults—the case where there are two or more faulty
devices in an IoT environment at a time. To do this, we inject
additional faults into our single faults experiments to cause
cases where possibly all devices can have fail-stop and non-
fail stop faults simultaneously. We primarily inject fail-stop
faults in this evaluation, because power outages and connection
disruptions are common ways for multiple faults to occur at
once. However, it is also possible for hazards in the environment
to causes simultaneous non-fail stop faults, so we inject some
non-fail stops as well in this evaluation.
Multiple device faults increase the incorrect states, cause
more unreliability in devices, and cause our handling functions
to be less effective. The “Multiple“ section in Figure 8 shows
the number of incorrect states caused by multiple faults. This
scenario decreases the reduction in incorrect states from the no-
handle case; the transient-resistant scheme reduces the number
of incorrect states by 36.68%. It still performs the best, but it
showed less than a 1.00% improvement over the other schemes.
While multiple faults cause more incorrect states that can
potentially be fixed, both our redundant device functions
and rollback are less effective. Multiple faults can cause
failures in redundant devices at the same time as the devices
they are backing up. Also, checkpoints become less accurate
for use in rollback, as faulty devices cannot be used when
finding a matching checkpoint, thus increasing the number
of possibly matching checkpoints to choose. Finally, as a
system approaches total failure, partially successful handling
may have a reduced effect or none at all. For example, multiple
faults cause both the leak sensor and the alarm actuator to be
faulty, affecting Apps 1-4,6,7,10. If only one of the devices
were faulty, handling the fault would correct the state of the
alarm. With both devices being faulty, correcting only one
device has no impact on the alarm’s correctness. Therefore,
the more concurrent faults in the system, the less impact a
fault handler will have. Even so, in this worst-case, IOTREPAIR
still substantially reduces the effects of faults.
Cascading Faults. Our applications are susceptible to cascad-
ing faults—which are cases where a fault in one device causes
incorrect states in a second device through inter-application
interactions. These cascading faults can be unpredictable
because the application that places a device in a faulty state
might not directly utilize the value of the faulty device, and the
application interaction may not even be intended. For example,
a temperature sensor becoming stuck at a low temperature
causes the following sequence of events and actuations in
App3, App7, and App11:
heater-off temp<60−−−−−→App3: heater-on heater-on−−−−−→App7:close-window
which contradicts another completely separate sequence:
window-closed time: 7am−−−−−→App11: open-window
In this example, App7 causes the window to close as a
cascading result of App3’s action responding to a fault in the
temperature sensor. This contradicts App11, which dictates that
the window should be open due to the current time. Because
of this, even if the temperature sensor is repaired, the system
may not return to the proper state. The complicated inter-
application relationship of cascading faults lends additional
value to our environmental functions. For instance, since
rollback considers the entire system state when choosing a
checkpoint, it recognizes that the heater should be off and
windows should be open, correcting the fault.
VIII. LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
The evaluation of the effectiveness of IOTREPAIR’s fault
handling is limited for several reasons. First, for every run,
every device used the same scheme. This means that device-
based differences in optimal schemes are not shown to their full
effect, as improvements in one device could be canceled out by
another device that performs better under a different scheme.
Second, we did not design our experiments to target the key
distinguishing features of the schemes, such as adding frequent
short transient faults to thwart the transient-resistant scheme or
adding metrics to represent time sensitivity. Lastly, as indicated
in our implementation, the randomness in fault injection, while
necessary for practical evaluation, also causes fluctuation in
results between device executions. This may cause the most
effective scheme to change between executions. We plan to
conduct more extensive experiments in a simulated IoT testbed
to cover various IoT device failures through injecting more
targeted faults with different types and sequences.
We restrict our evaluation to a moderate set of IoT devices
and applications. It allows more tractable outputs to evaluate
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our fault-handling functions and the effect of faults. More
sophisticated systems with a diverse set of devices and apps,
especially in the settings of industrial IoT and automobiles,
would allow for a more thorough evaluation. For instance,
the increase in the number of devices would lead to more
cascading faults, as well as increasing the probability of device
correlation and allowing some of our underutilized functions
such as device redundancy to be more effective. This would
also allow for suppression of entire apps to be effective, as the
primary use of this technique is to stop cascading faults.
IX. RELATED WORK
We present related work on recent literature that explores
fault identification and handling in IoT systems.
Fault Identification. Fault identification techniques aim to de-
termine the presence of a fault and determine the faulty device
and type. We characterize the fault identification techniques
for IoT systems into three groups. First, network traffic-based
techniques analyze sensor data packets to detect faults [35],
[36]. Network-level techniques are effective at identifying fail-
stop failures but ignore non-fail-stop faults. Second, redundant
sensor-based techniques use data from multiple homogeneous
sensors and exploit the fact that spatial sensing of close sensors
should yield similar sensor states [37], [7], [2]. However,
these systems are costly due to the requirement of multiple
sensors and, more importantly, ineffective when considering
that simultaneous sensor faults are common in IoT. Lastly,
sensor-based techniques use data obtained from various types
of sensors for fault identification. These techniques apply to
environments such as smart homes where various sensors states
are available and often correlated [8], [12], [11]. While these
techniques differ in scope, precision, and methodology, they
limit their analysis to sensors that have binary readings and
do not identify fault types.
Fault Handling. Very little work has been done in fault
handling in IoT systems. The explored techniques often aim at
specific environments and faults. A fault-tolerant technique [14]
for redundancy-free UAV sensors use imperfect replication to
allow near-correct device operation in the presence of a sensor
failure. While this work poses a good argument for the value
of imperfect replication, the functions are specific to UAV
sensors and do nothing to repair faults. Rivulet [9] aims at
removing the edge device as a single point of failure to mitigate
connection faults by distributing communication to devices. The
core drawback of this technique is that it does not handle the
far more common sensor and actuator faults. Transactuations is
a fault-handling technique introduced in [15] to address some
flaws that transactions have in IoT environments. This enhanced
technique better prevents physical device states from losing
synchronization with software variables. While this is useful
for preserving dependencies, it does nothing to repair faults
and cannot correct errors that occur before the fault is detected.
To the best of our knowledge, no current techniques develop a
fault handler for diverse IoT device failures and bundles fault
identification and fault handling to mitigate faults.
Fig. 9: Power overhead of Fault Handling: Consumed energy
from events, actuations, and restarts across no-handle, suppres-
sion, and schemes for our evaluations.
X. CONCLUSIONS
We presented IOTREPAIR1, a novel fault handler for IoT
deployments in the form of a flexible library that integrates with
edge devices and can be customized to meet the requirements
for diverse environments. IOTREPAIR is organized by a set
of schemes to fit the handler to different deployments, and
uses runtime redundant device detection and fault history to
autonomously adapt to the devices and faults in the environment.
With a good identification module, IOTREPAIR could remove
more than 50.01% or more of errors caused by faults.
APPENDIX
Table VII 1 presents examples of single device faults for
each IoT App. For instance, A failure in window opener in
App7, Energy-Saver, causes the window to be open incorrectly
for 1,620 polls, but the fault handler corrects the state after
300 polls, reducing incorrect states by 81.48%.
In Table VII 3 , we show two cascading faults that each
involve three different applications.
In this set of experiments, we tracked how many events
occurred, actuations were performed, and restarts were issued
with and without fault handling. We then convert these metrics
into the power cost of each action to get the power overhead
of each execution in the evaluations. We found that power
overhead for IOTREPAIR is negligible. In Figure 9, we show the
power consumption of each experiment execution. In single
fault evaluation, the worst scheme reduces power consumption
from no handler by 64.23%. Multiple faults has a worst case
of 89.36% decrease in power consumption from no handle
to scheme. This decrease in power consumption is because
faults cause many unnecessary events and actuations, and
fault handling reduces these by suppressing and repairing the
faulty devices. Relative to the power consumption caused by
unhandled faults, the additional power for restarts and functions
like rollback are minor. Similar to the effectiveness evaluations
Overall, we find that our power overhead of our functions is
small and insignificant compared to the power consumption
generated by unhandled faults.
1An extended version of this paper is available with substantially more
methodology description, performance evaluation details, and commentary [38].
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ID† App ID Fault Description Implication of Faults on IoT environment‡
1
App1
Motion sensor fails to
report its state
1 Light is off when the user is in the room
2 Light is on when the user is not in the room
3 Light is on when the user is in the room and off when not
App2 Smoke detector stuck at
smoke-detected
1 Alarm sounds and door is unlocked when there is no smoke
2 and 3 Alarm is off and door is locked when there is no smoke
App3 Temperature sensor fails to
report its state
1 Heater is on when it is warm and AC is off when it is too hot
2 and 3 Heater is off when it is too cold and AC is off when it is too hot
App4
Leak-detector stuck at
leak-not-detected
1 Alarm is off when there is a water leak
2 Alarm sounds briefly when there is no leak
3 Alarm sounds when there is a leak and off when there is no water leak
App5 Door lock fails to report or
change its state
1 Door is unlocked when the user is not home
2 and 3 Door is unlocked when the user is not home
App6 Presence sensor stuck at
not-present
1 and 2 Several SMS sent to users about insecure patio when they are home
3 No SMS sent to users about insecure patio when they are home
App7 Window opener stuck at
window-open
1 and 2 Window is open when heater or air conditioner is active
3 Window is briefly open when heater or air conditioner is active
App4 Watervalve actuator stuck
at open
1 and 2 Watervalve is open when there is a leak
3 Watervalve is briefly open when there is a leak
App9 Motion sensor stuck at
motion-inactive
1 , 2 and 3 SMS is not sent when motion is active and user is not home
App2,10 Smoke detector stuck at
smoke-detected
1 and 2 Alarm is on, door is unlocked, and lights flash when there is no
smoke
3 Alarm is off, door is locked, and lights are off when there is no smoke
2
App 1,5,6,8-11
Presence sensor stuck at
user-home, and light
switch stuck at on
1 and 2 Door is unlocked and window is open when the user is not home
(App8), SMS is failed to notify user when there is movement at patio (App6)
and in the house when user is away (App9), light switch is on when there is
no alarm (App10) and user is not in the room (App1)
3 Door is unlocked when user is not home (App8), SMS fails to send when
there is movement on the patio (App6) and movement in the house when user
is away (App9), window is closed at user-specified time (App11)
App1,3,9
Motion sensor stuck at
motion-inactive, AC stuck
at on, heater fails to report
its state
1 and 2 SMS is not sent when motion is active while user is not home
(App9), light-switch off when user is in a room (App1), air conditioner on when
temp is too low (App3), heater is off when temp is too low (App3)
3 Light switch is off when user is in room(App1), AC on while temperature
is too low (App3)
App1-4,6,7,10
Temp sensor and contact
sensor fails to report its
state, leak detector and
light switch stuck at leak
detected and on, alarm
stuck at off
1 and 2 Alarm is off when there is a leak (App4) and when there is smoke
(App2), SMS is not sent to the user when there is activity at patio (App6), light
switch is on when there is no alarm (App10) and when user is not in the room
(App1), heater is off when temperature is too low and air conditioner is off
when temperature is too high(App3)
3 Alarm off when there is a leak (App4) and when there is smoke (App2)
3
App3,7,11 Temp sensor stuck at a low
temp value
The low temp sensor causes the heater on by App3, even when the real
temperature is high. The heater being on then causes the window to close due
to App7, but the window was supposed to be open due to App11.
App1,2,10 Smoke detector stuck at
smoke-detected state
App2 turns on alarm when smoke is detected, which then causes App10 to turn
on the lights, but the lights should be off because of the App1.
† 1 is for single faults, 2 is for multiple faults, and 3 is for cascading faults.
‡ 1 is without fault handling, 2 uses device suppression, and 3 uses conservative fault handling scheme.
TABLE VII: Examples of various faults, their impact IoT environments, and results of fault handling schemes.
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